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:Lending With Guaranties After Deprizio -
Lenders, Guard Your Coffers; the Courts and
Trustees are at the Gate
INTRODUCTION
As virtually every practitioner in the Bankruptcy and Banking
areas should know, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
added a troubling new wrinkle to the business of lending money,
by ,its holding and opinion in Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial
Corp: (In re V.N. Deprizio Construction Co.).1 For those-who have
not yet heard of or read the opinion, the central holding of the case
is that where a lender extends a loan to a corporation and contem-
poraneously accepts the guarantee of an insider of the corporation
to ensure repayment of the loan, and then accepts payments due
under the loan within one year of the filing of bankruptcy by the
corporation, the payments made to the lender are subject to recov-
ery by the Trustee as avoidable preferences.
2
Since the Deprizio opinion was handed down, it has been the
subject of much controversy and commentary.3 Additionally, two
other circuits have now joined the Seventh Circuit in this matter,"
in each instance, soundly rejecting the "equity" and "two-transfer"
approaches which had previously found support in a majority of
1. 874 F2d 1186 (7th Cir 1989).
2. Id.
3. See for example, Note, The Interplay Between Sections 547(b) and .550 of the
Bankruptcy Code, 89 Colum L Rev 530 (1989); Katzen, Deprizio and Bankruptcy Code
Section 550: Extended Preference Exposure via Insider Guarantees, and Other Perils of
Initial Transferee Liability, 45 Bus Law 511 (February 1990);and Borowitz, Waiving Subro-
gation Rights and Conjuring up Demons in Response to Deprizio, 45 Bus Law 2151 (August
1990).
, 4. The Sixth and Tenth Circuits have done so.in Manufacturers Hanover Leasing v
Lowrey (In re Robinson Bros. Drilling), 892 F2d 850 (10th Cir 1989)(per curiam), aff'g 97
Bankr 77 (W D Okla 1988) and Ray v City Bank & Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage Co.), 899
F2d 1490 (6th Cir 1990), reversing in part and affirming in part, 70 Bankr 928 (E D Tenn
1987).,
As noted, the Tenth Circuit decision was rendered via a per curiam opinion. The Tenth
Circuit simply affirmed the judgment of the district court and adopted its opinion. Manu-
facturers Hanover, 892 F2d 850. The district court's opinion was entered several months
prior to the decision in Deprizio and therefore does not address that opinion.
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the courts.'
The purpose and scope of this comment will be to examine the
history of avoidable preferences under the Code" before Deprizio,
scrutinize the opinion and rationale of Deprizio and its progeny,
and finally explore the desireability and persuasive force of
Deprizio's rationale.
I. THE HISTORY OF AVOIDABLE PREFERENCES UNDER THE CODE
BEFORE Deprizio: JUDICIAL FICTION AND "EQUITY" REIGN SUPREME
When the bankruptcy laws were re-written in 1978, 7 Congress
substantially altered the law with regard to avoidable preferences,
purportedly in order to bring such laws "into conformity with com-
mercial practice and the Uniform Commercial Code."' 8 The current
Code section 547,9 which is the section governing preferences, is
modeled after Section 60 of the Act with several significant
changes.' 0 Under the Act, a trustee seeking to avoid a transfer as
preferential had to prove both that the debtor was insolvent at the
time of the transfer and that the preferred creditor had reason to
5. See notes 26-37 and the corresponding text.
6. The Bankruptcy Code, 11 USC §§ 101 et seq (Colliers 1989).
7. The former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended by the Act of June 22, 1938, Pub
L No 75-696, 52 Stat 840, was repealed in 1978 by Pub L No 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat 2549,
2682. For the sake of clarity and simplicity, the author will simply refer to the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 and its amendments as "the Act," and will refer to the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 and its amendments as "the Code."
8. H Rep No 95-595, 95th Cong, 1st Sess 372 (1977); S Rep No 95-989, 95th Cong, 2d
Sess 87 (1978).
9. 11 USC § 547, which provides in relevant part:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid any
transfer of an interest of the debtor in property -
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such
transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made -
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of the
petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive
if -
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided
by the provisions of this title.
10. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat 544, as amended by the Act of June 22, 1938,
Pub L No 75-696, § 60, 52 Stat 840, 870, repealed by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
(cited in note 7).
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know of the debtor's insolvency." The Code has eliminated these
requirements and has, in fact, created a statutory presumption
that the debtor was insolvent during the entire 90-day period prior
to the filing of the petition.12
Thus, under the Code, in order for a trustee to avoid any trans-
fer, he or she must simply establish the existence of the following
criteria: 1) that a transfer was made to, or for the benefit of, a
creditor, 2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the
debtor, 3) which was made while the debtor was insolvent, 4) and
was made either on or within 90 days of the filing of bankruptcy,
or, if the creditor is an insider of the debtor, between 90 days and
one year before the filing, and 5) which transfer permits the credi-
tor to receive more than it would have received had the transfer
not been made or, which permits the creditor to receive more that
it would have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation.1 3 Under a typical
scenario, recovery by the trustee of preferential payments works to
the benefit of all of the creditors.' Rather than permit one credi-
tor to be benefitted or "preferred," to the detriment of all other
creditors, the Code has provided the mechanism for the recovery of
these preferential transfers of assets so that such assets are availa-
ble for distribution via a pre-determined formula for such
11. Id.
12. 11 USC § 547(f) provides in its entirety: "For the purposes of this section, the
debtor is presumed to have been insolvent on and during the 90 days immediately preceding
the date of the filing of the petition."
The requirement that the trustee establish knowledge by the insider of the debtor's insol-
vency was removed in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,
Pub L No 98-353, 98 Stat 333 (1984). Subsection (b)(4)(B) of Pub L No 98-353, § 462(b)(2),
(codified at 11 USC 547(b)(4)(B), substituted "between ninety days and one year before the
date of filing of the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider ... "
for "between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if such
creditor, at the time of such transfer -(i) was an insider; and (ii) had reasonable cause to
believe that the debtor was insolvent at the time of such transfer;..." 11 USC § 547 (Cum
Supp 1990 p 60, under the heading "Historical and Statutory Notes").
13. 11 USC § 547(b) (cited in note 9).
14. As one commentator has explained,
The vulnerability of eve-of-bankruptcy collections is nothing new. When an insolvent
debtor chooses (or is forced) to pay one of its general unsecured obligations, the re-
cipient creditor is preferred -that is, the creditor gets more than it would through the
system of priorities and pro rata participation that governs distribution in liquidation
under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. To foster Congress' prescribed treatment
for all creditors and to discourage a destructive race for assets, sections 547 and 550
of the Bankruptcy Code allow a trustee first to avoid certain preferential transfers
and then to recover their value for redistribution through the bankruptcy estate.
Katzen, Deprizio, 45 Bus Law 511, 512 (cited in note 3).
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distributions. 5
The problem which arose in Deprizio was created largely by the
literal and relatively straightforward language of Section 547, when
read in combination with Section 550 and the definitional sec-
tions.' 6 Under the definitional sections, "creditor" is any entity
with a claim against the debtor.' 7 "Claim," on the other hand, is so
expansively defined as to include every right to payment, whether
"fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, le-
gal, equitable, secured or unsecured."' 8
When one examines the first criterion for avoidance under sec-
tion 547 in light of these definitions, the potential exposure of the
outside creditor who accepts an insider guaranty comes more
clearly into focus.' An insider of a corporation who gives his or her
guaranty on a debt owed by the corporation clearly becomes, upon
granting such guaranty, an entity with a right of payment, albeit
contingent and unmatured, from the corporation. Thus, assuming
arguendo that the other factors necessary to establish a preference
exist, any payments made by the debtor in satisifaction of the debt
guaranteed by the insider are, by the express and literal language
of the statute, transfers "for the benefit of a creditor" and would
15. Id.
16. 11 USC § 550 is the Code section which permits a trustee to recover the assets
which were transferred to the extent to which those transfers can be avoided under, inter
alia, section 547. The full text of the relevant part of section 550 provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a transfer is
avoided-under section 544,-545, 547, 548, 549, 553(b), or 724(a) of this title, the tris-
tee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the court
so orders, the value of such property, from -
(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such
transfer was made; or
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.
The definitional sections are found at 11 USC § 101, and provide in relevant part as
follows:
(9) "creditor" means -
(A) entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or
before the order for relief concerning the debtor;
(4) "claim" means -
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,. liqui-
dated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undis-
puted, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured . .
17. 11 USC §101(9)(A).
18. 11 USC § 101(4)(A).
19. When read together, the definitional sections and section 547 simply require the
trustee to show that a transfer was made to, or for the benefit of, an entity which holds a
right to payment against the debtor, no matter how contingent, disputed or unmatured that
right to payment might be. 11 USC §§ 547(b)(1) and 101(4)(A).
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be preferential, and thus avoidable, by a trustee.20 Because section
547(b)(4)(B) extends the preferential period from 90 days to one
year in cases where the "creditor" is an insider of the debtor, this
extended reachback period could be applied to the outside creditor
in the above scenario.21 This is so because each payment to the
outside creditor is a payment "for the benefit of" the inside guar-
antor, as it reduces the guarantor's contingent liability on the debt.
Add to this analysis the language of section 550, permitting the
trustee to recover any such preferential transfers from either the
initial transferee (for example, the outside creditor/lender in the
above scenario) or the entity for whose benefit the transfer was
made (for example, the insider guarantor), and you have the recipe
for Deprizio.22
So why the shock when the Seventh Circuit adopted the brave
stance that sections 547 and 550 mean exactly what they say? In
fact, given the literal language of these sections of the Code, how
can it reasonably be argued that the result reached in Deprizio was
somehow unforeseen? As far back as 1981, at least one commenta-
,tor was predicting the result in Deprizio based purely on a literal
reading of the Code.23
20. 11 USC §§ 101(4)(A), 101(9)(A), 547(b) and 550(a).
21. 11 USC §§ 547(b)(4)(B).
22. 11 USC § 550(a)(1).
23. Thomas E. Pitts, Jr., in his article entitled Insider Guaranties and The Law of
Preferences, examined the literal language and potential impact of Code sections 547 and
550 in light of a hypothetical set of facts which are remarkably similar to the facts in
Deprizio. Mr. Pitts' hypothetical was as follows:
The following unexceptional set of facts will form the basis for our analysis. Two
years prior to the filing of the petition, Bank made an unsecured term loan to Debtor
requiring monthly payments, all of which are paid on time up to the date that Debtor
files a petition under the Code. Guarantor is the principal stockholder and president
of Debtor and has guaranteed its indebtedness to Bank. The evidence is clear that (1)
Debtor was insolvent during the entire year preceding the filing of the peitition, (2)
Guarantor had reasonable cause to believe that such was the case, and (3) each pay-
ment during that year enabled Bank to receive more than it would have received
under chapter 7 of the Code absent that payment. The evidence is equally clear, how-
ever, that Bank was not an insider at any time during that year and never had rea-
sonable cause to believe Debtor was insolvent.
Thomas E. Pitts, Insider Guaranties and The Law of Preferences, 55 Am Bank L J 343, 344
(1981) (footnotes omitted).
This "unexceptional set of facts" lead Mr. Pitts to the unexceptional conclusion that "each
payment 'to' Bank was also 'for the benefit of' Guarantor because it reduced his contingent
liability to Bank under the guaranty. . . . Consequently, these last three payments to Bank
were voidable preferences for the additional reason that they were made 'for the benefit of a
creditor' who thereby received a benefit equally as disproportionate as the benefit received
by Bank." Id at 345.
It should be noted that Mr. Pitts' work was written and published before the 1984 amend-
1990
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The shock at the Seventh Circuit's result most likely stems from
the prior judicial treatment of the issue. While no circuit court had
ever ruled on the issue, several lower courts had reached the same
result as the Seventh Circuit.24 This approach, however, was still in
the minority.2 5 Prior to this, most courts which had considered the
issue had held that the outside creditor could not be held liable in
such circumstances. These courts had primarily adopted one of two
approaches in order to avoid imposing liability on such a creditor.
As will be demonstrated below, most courts purported to give ef-
fect to the actual language of the Code, all the while, protecting
the outside creditor. Only the courts employing the "equitable con-
siderations" approach explicitly acknowledged that such a -reading
was inconsistent With a literal interpretation of the language of the
statute.26 An evaluation of these differing judicial approaches is
warranted in order to understand the confusion and controversy
created by the Seventh Circuit.
Beginning in approximately 1984, a dichotomy of approaches be-
gan to develop with regard to the liability of outside creditors for
transfers made during the extended preference period.27 In that
ments to the Code, which among other things, eliminated the requirement that the Trustee
establish that the insider guarantor had reason to believe that the debtor was insolvent
during the entire year preceding the filing of the petition. See note 11. This fact is clearly
indicated by the slight difference in his hypothetical, but does not affect our analysis here,
nor does it alter his prophetic analysis in 1981.
24. The district court in Deprizio was one such court. Levit v Ingersoll Rand Finan-
cial Corporation, (In re V.N. Deprizio Construction Company) 86 Bankr 545 (1988). See
also, note 25 and the cases cited therein.
25. See for example, Mixon v Mid-Continent Sys., Inc. (In re Big Three Transp.,
Inc.), 41 Bankr 16, 20-21 (W D Ark 1983); Mixon v Anderson (In re Ozark Restaurant
Equip. Co., Inc.), 41 Bankr 476, 479-80 (W D Ark 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on
other issues, 61 Bankr 750 (W D Ark 1986), aff'd 816 F2d 1222 (8th Cir 1987), cert denied,
484 US 848 (1987); First State Bank v W.E. Tucker Oil Co. Inc. (In re W.E. Tucker Oil
Co.), 42 Bankr 897, 901 (W D Ark 1984); Lowrey v First National Bank of Bethany (In re
Robinson Bros. Drilling Inc.), 97 Bankr 77 (W D Okla 1988); and Coastal Petroleum Corp. v
Union Bank & Trust Co. (In re Coastal Petroleum Cbrp.), 91 Bankr 35 (N D Ohio 1988).
26. The "equity," or "equitable considerations" approach as it has become known,
calls upon a court to invoke its equitable powers under 11 USC § 105(a) and 28 USC § 1481
in order to avoid the inequitable result of holding an outside creditor liable for payments
made during the extended preference period applicable to insiders. See notes 33-37 and the
corresponding text.
27. Prior to the decision in In re Mercon Industries, (cited in note 28), only a handful
of cases had been decided on the issue of outside creditor liability for transfers made be-
tween 90 days and one year before the filing of the petition. See notes 25 and 34, and the
cases cited therein. It was the decision in In re Mercon Industries which created the dichot-
omy of "majority" approaches, that is, the dichotomy between the majority of the courts
(these are hereinafter referred to as the "equitable approach" and the "two-transfer the-
ory"). The cases cited in note 25, which predate both Mercon and Deprizio but which follow
Comments
year, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania handed down its decision in In re Mercon
Industries.28
The case presented for consideration in In re Mercon Industries
involved a familiar set of facts; the trustee had filed a complaint
against an outside creditor of the debtor in order to recover pay-
ments made on the debt within one year of the filing of the peti-
tion. These debts were guaranteed by two insiders of the debtor
corporation. On the defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint
for failure to state a cause of action, the court, speaking through
Judge Goldhaber, ruled that the outside creditor could not be held
liable for such payments under sections 547(b) and 550. In so rul-
ing, the court held that "the single transfer of funds to Goldman
effected two transfers under the Code, due to the secondary liabil-
ity of the guarantors. One transfer was from the debtor to
Goldman in satisfaction of the primary indebtedness. The other
was the transfer to the guarantors in satisfaction of their contin-
gent liability.""9 The court noted that section 547 only permits
avoidance of transfers to outside creditors within a limited 90-day
window, the longer one-year period being reserved exclusively for
transfers to insiders." Therefore, only the transfer to the guaran-
tors could be avoided.
Enunciating what has become known as the two-transfer theory,
the court stated that its position was supported by the language of
sections 547 and 550, as well as "a noted commentary on the
Code," namely, Collier.3 ' Section 550 supports the result, reasoned
the Deprizio result, constitute a third approach. This third approach, following Deprizio,
has emerged as a separate majority (hereinafter and heretofore referred to as the "Deprizio
approach"), thereby creating a triad of judicial approaches to the problem.
Purely for purposes of classifying the approaches into categories, those cases which were
decided prior to the 1984 Amendments to the Code were enacted, see note 12, have been
ignored. Granted, those cases could easily be categorized into a fourth category, known as
the "combination equitable/literal interpretation approach." See for example, Sheeley v
Church Buildings and Interiors, Inc. (In re Church Buildings and Interiors, Inc.), 14 Bankr
128 (W D Okla 1981); Bakst v Schilling (In re Cove Patio Corp.), 19 Bankr 843 (S D Fla
1982) and Backhus v Central Trust Company (In re Duccilli Formal Wear, Inc.), 8 BCD
1180 (Bankr S D Ohio 1982).
28. Goldberger v Davis Jay Corregated Box Corp. (In re Mercon Industries), 37
Bankr 549 (E D Pa 1984).
29. Goldberger, 37 Bankr at 552.
30. Id.
31. Id at 551 (citing 4 Collier on Bankruptcy 550.02, at 550-7 (15th ed 1983)). The
passage quoted from Collier states in full:
(I)f a transfer is made to a creditor who is not an insider more than 90 days but
within one year before bankruptcy and the effect is to preferentially benefit an in-
1990
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the Court, that "the mediate transfer to the insiders may be an
actionable preference under Section 547(b) although the immedi-
ate transfer to Goldman is not."'32
*Thus, while purporting to give effect to the literal language of
the statute, the two-transfer approach causes one to engage in
some significant mental gymnastics. Some courts have referred to
this approach as a fiction,33 while at least one commentator has
noted that it requires a tortured construction of the statute.3,4
The second judicial approach to the problem has been based on
"equitable considerations," thereby forcing a bankruptcy court to
call upon its equitable powers.35 The courts adopting this approach
have typically acknowledged that a literal reading of sections
547(b) and 550 support an action for recovery against the outside
creditor, but invoke their equitable powers, and generally Collier
as well, to avoid that result.3 6
sider-quarantor, recovery should be restricted to the guarantor and the creditor
should be protected. Otherwise a creditor who does not demand a guarantor can be
better off than one who does.
Id.
32. Goldberger, 37 Bankr at 552 (footnotes omitted).
33. See for example, Block v Texas Comm. Bank Natl. Assoc. (In re Midwestern Com-
panies, Inc.), 102 Bankr 169 (W D Miss 1989)
34. See Note, The Interplay Between Sections 547(b) and 550 of the Bankruptcy
Code, 89 Colum L Rev 530, 534 (1989).
35. The equitable powers which are conferred upon the courts, pursuant to 11 USC
section 105(a), include "issu[ing] any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appro-
priate to carry out the provisions ..." of the Code.
The portion of Collier's treatise on bankruptcy, cited in note"33, also cites the equitable
powers of a bankruptcy court, which are conferred in 28 USC section 1481. As one commen-
tator has noted, quite accurately,
Section 1481 reads in relevant part: 'A bankruptcy court shall have the powers of a
court of equity . . .' [28 USC § 1481.] Although this section was to become effective
April 1, 1984, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub L No 95-598, § 402(b), 92 Stat
2549, 2682, it was repealed before it took effect by the Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-353, § 113, 98 Stat 333, 343.
See Note, 89 Colum L Rev 530, 536, n.32 (cited in note 34).
36. See for example, Schmitt v Equibank (In re R.A. Beck Builder, Inc.), 34 Bankr
888 (W D Pa 1983); In re Aerco Metals, Inc., 60 Bankr 77 (N D Tex 1985); Block v Texas
Comm. Bank Natl. Assoc. (In re Midwestern Companies, Inc.), 102 Bankr 169 (W D Mo
1989); Ray v City Bank & Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage Co., Inc.), 70 Bankr 928 (E D Tenn
1987); T.B. Westex Foods, Inc. v Alaska Continental Bank (In re T.B. Westex Foods, Inc.),
96 Bankr 77 (W D Tex 1989).
The passage from Collier which is most frequently invoked in the cases which apply equi-
table considerations provides as follows: "In some circumstances, a literal application of sec-
tion 550(a) would permit the trustee to recover from a party who is innocent of wrongdoing
and deserves protection." 4 Collier § 550.02, at 550-58 (cited in note 3). In such circum-
stances the bankruptcy court should exercise its discretion to use its equitable powers under
section 105(a) and 28 USC Section 1481 to prevent an inequitable result. Id.
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In Ray v City Bank & Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage Co., Inc.),3 7
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee applied this equitable approach to deny recovery by the
trustee, of monies paid by the debtor to an outsider bank, outside
the 90 day preference period but within the one-year period, even
though the monies paid were in satisfaction of a debt of an insider
of the debtor and the payments were made by the debtor. The
court there stated, in relevant part:
The trustee generally can recover preferential payments only if they were
made within the 90 days before the date on which the bankruptcy petition
was filed. However, preferential transfers to an insider . . . can be recovered
if they were made within a year before bankruptcy. A literal reading of Sec-
tions 547(b)(1) and 550(a)(1) would allow the trustee to recover preferential
payments to a non-insider creditor made more than 90 days but within a
year before the bankruptcy if the payments also preferred an insider. Most
courts, however, have rejected this interpretation of the statutes. They have
held that insider preferences outside the 90 days can be recovered only from
the insider. The court agrees with the majority ...
Thus, the court rejects a literal reading of Section 550(a)(1) on this point
38
Thus, while admitting that the Code provides for such a result,
numerous courts have refused to apply the Code as written, and
have simply focused on reaching an "equitable" result."
II. Deprizio: STRICT CONSTRUCTION AND THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
The opinion and rationale of the unanimous panel of the Sev-
enth Circuit in Deprizio has been examined so thoroughly and ex-
haustively that lengthy analysis here would not be fruitful or even
helpful.40 The essential elements of the court's opinion can be
37. 70 Bankr 928 (E D Tenn 1987). Note that the bankruptcy court's decision in this
case was affirmed by the district court but reversed by the Sixth Circuit. See notes 4 and 52-
60 and the accompanying text. Nonetheless, the bankruptcy court's opinion still represents
an accurate depiction of -the approach taken by the majority of lower courts that have con-
sidered the issue before Deprizio.
38. Ray, 70 Bankr at 933-34 (citations omitted).
39. See for example, In re Midwestern Companies and the following language used by
the Bankruptcy Court therein:
[I]t has long been recognized that a preference action is a creature of equity and that
the bankruptcy courts, in employing the doctrine, are to apply equitable principles.
The case decisions which have held that recovery cannot be had against a bank in
circumstances such as those at bar have simply seized upon the obvious unfairness
and inequity of permitting the trustee to recover under such circumstances.
Block v Texas Commerce Bank Nat. Assoc. (In re Midwestern Companies, Inc.), 96 Bankr
224, 225 (W D Mo 1988)(footnotes and citations omitted).
40. See for example, Katzen, Deprizio, 45 Bus Law 511 (cited in note 13); and
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highlighted in relatively short order.
According to the Seventh Circuit, the text of the bankruptcy
statute mandates that if the transfer is avoidable under section
547(b), the court must permit the trustee to exercise his or her
option under section 550(a), to recover from either the initial
transferee or the entity for whose benefit the transfer was made.
This textual argument is controlling for the court; no other theory
of construction is persuasive when faced with the clear language of
a statute such as here.
The two-transfer theory was unavailing. Such an approach, ac-
cording to the court, requires that one view transfer from the re-
cipients' perspective while the Code "consistently defines it from
the debtor's. A single payment therefore is one 'transfer', no mat-
ter how many persons gain thereby." '41
The "equitable considerations" argument was not even raised by
the creditors.42 Nonetheless, the court examined the "equity argu-
ments (which) have captivated a majority of the bankruptcy judges
and several of the commentators who have spoken on this sub-
ject," '43 concluding the analysis with this query:
At all events, in what sense is it 'inequitable' to recapture payments to cred-
itors that may have been favored only because payment reduced insiders'
exposure (recall that the insiders select which debts to pay first), then dis-
tribute these monies according to statutory priorities and contractual enti-
tlements? In what sense is it 'inequitable' to require the outside lenders to
pursue the inside guarantors for any shortfall, when they bargained for ex-
actly that recourse?
4 4
The "cousin to 'equity' arguments,"'4 5 or policy arguments, were
Borowitz, Waiving Subrogation Rights and Conjuring Up Demons in Response to Deprizio,
45 Bus Law 2151 (August 1990) and the materials cited therein at n.2. See also, the materi-
als cited in note 3.
41. Deprizio, 874 F2d at 1195-96.
42. The court noted in this regard, "Perhaps our rebuff to 'equity' arguments in other
bankruptcy cases is responsible." Deprizio, 874 F2d at 1197 (citations omitted).
43. Id at 1198.
44. Id at 1198. In examining the equity argument, the court noted:
Rules of law affecting parties to voluntary arrangements do not operate 'inequitably'
in the business world-at least not once the rule is understood. Prices adjust. If the
extended preference period facilitates the operation of bankruptcy as a collective
debt-adjustment process, then credit will become available on slightly better terms. If
a longer period has the opposite effect, creditors will charge slightly higher rates of
interest and monitor debtors more closely. In either case creditors will receive the
competitive rate of return in financial markets-the same risk adjusted rate they




similarly unpersuasive for the court. The creditors argued that the
extended preference-period liability for outside creditors would
cause the lenders to "precipitate bankruptcy filings at the slightest
sign of trouble in order to prevent erosion of their positions."'46
One result of such a situation, argued the creditors, is that work-
outs will occur less frequently and formal bankruptcies will become
the norm. This is because workouts frequently involve guaranties,
and the extended preference period, in instances where there is an
insider guaranty, will discourage workouts.
Again, the court was unpersuaded by these arguments, noting
that "unless there is a 'preference,' there is nothing for the trustee
to avoid.' 7 The panel then proceeded to analyze all of the availa-
ble exclusions contained in section 547(c) stating, "[iut is enough to
observe that Section 547(b)(5) and (c), . . . exclude from recovery
the bulk of ordinary commercial payments."' 8 Ultimately, the
court concluded that:
In light of these exclusions, there is no reason to use ambulatory arguments
of 'equity' or 'policy' to defeat the Trustee's claims in this case. Congress
has considered and addressed specifically the situations that most concern
lenders. If these exclusions and exemptions are not 'enough', creditors
should complain to Congress.49
With these words and many others, the Seventh Circuit opened
the gates to the coffers of lenders, thereby sending the financial
community into a state of extreme unease and uncertainty.
III. ENTER, THE OTHER CIRCUITS
Had Deprizio been the only case which held that an outside
creditor could be made to disgorge all payments made by a debtor
during the entire year preceding bankruptcy, simply because the
lender had required an inside guarantor, it would have been reason
enough for concern by lenders. But, since the Seventh Circuit's
opinion, two other circuits have also so held,50 and an appeal to the
Eighth Circuit was settled before any opinion was rendered. 1 It
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id at 1199.
49. Id at 1200.
50. Although, the Tenth Circuit's per curiam opinion is not particularly helpful to our
analysis here inasmuch as it merely adopts the opinion of the district court below. See note
4.
51. See note 4 and the cases cited therein. Additionally, as noted, an appeal was filed
with the Eight' Circuit in Block v Texas Commerce Bank Nat. Assoc. (In re Midwestern
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seems clear that the issue will not die with the Seventh Circuit's
opinion but will continue until there is 1) a split in the circuits
sufficient to prompt the Supreme Court to grant certiorari,52 2) a
consensus among the circuits, adopting or rejecting the rationale of
Deprizio, or 3) Congressional action which alters the current state
of the law. With this in mind, turning to an analysis of the other
circuits' opinions in order to examine what is happening at least on
that front will be helpful.
In the Sixth Circuit,53 the president of the debtor corporation
took out personal loans in order to finance the business operations
of the debtor corporation. 4 These loans were cosigned by the pres-
ident's mother and secured by certificates of deposit.55
Within the year preceding the filing of the petition by the debtor
corporation, numerous payments were made by the corporation in
reduction of the personal debt of its president. Most of these pay-
ments were made directly to the bank by the corporation, while
several were made payable to the cosignor and were then endorsed
over to the bank.56 Thereafter, the trustee brought an action
against the bank seeking to recover these payments, alleging that
such payments constituted preferential transfers.
The Sixth Circuit, like the Seventh Circuit, adopted a literal-
reading approach in order to hold that the funds paid to the
outside creditor, during the extended preference period, could be
recovered by the trustee. 7 In the course of so holding, the Sixth
Cos.), 96 Bankr 224 (W D Mo 1989), aff'd, 102 Bankr 169 (W D Mo 1989), appeal filed, No
89-1877-MM (8th Cir May 17, 1989), but the case was settled prior to the issuance of an
opinion.
52. US S Ct Rule 10(1)(a). This rule provides that where there is disagreement be-
tween the Circuits on the same matter, such is of the character of reasons which the Su-
preme Court will consider in determining whether to grant certiorari.
53. Ray v City Bank & Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage Co., Inc.), 899 F2d 1490 (6th Cir
1990).
54. The court explained the facts on this issue as follows:
In March 1983, Carlos Foster, president of C-L Cartage Company ("Cartage"), the
debtor, approached City Bank and Trust Company ("the bank") for financing. The
bank refused to lend money to the company but agreed to make a personal loan to
Carlos of $30,000, on the condition that his mother . . . cosign the note and secure it
with certificates of deposit. . . . Carlos transferred the funds to Cartage to finance its
business operation. No promissory notes were signed or delivered by Cartage to the
Fosters.
Id at 1491.
55. Id. See note 54.
56. Ray, 899 F2d at 1491-92.
57. Id at 1494-95. The court stated in relevant part:
A literal reading of section 550(a)(1), together with sections 547(b)(1) and (b)(4)(B),
permits recovery from an outsider transferee for transfers made during the extended
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Circuit also rejected outright the equity arguments, stating
"(b)ankruptcy courts ... cannot use equitable principles to disre-
gard unambiguous statutory language."58
A different, but related, issue in the C-L Cartage case may prove
to be even more troubling to lenders. That issue regards the bank's
argument that because its loans to the insiders were fully secured,
the trustee could not establish the existence of the fifth element
required for a preference. 59 The court agreed that "[p]ayments to a
creditor who is fully secured are not preferential since the creditor
would receive payment up to the full value of his collateral in a
Chapter 7 liquidation."60 The Sixth Circuit, however, held that it
was the loans to the company from the insider (which were un-
secured), not the loans from the bank to the insider, which permit-
ted the "creditor"(the insider) to receive more than he would have
received in a Chapter 7 liquidation. 1 This aspect of the Sixth Cir-
cuit's opinion will be the subject of additional commentary in the
next section of this work, which section touches on some alterna-
tives to Deprizio-type lending.
The Tenth Circuit simply issued a per curiam opinion affirming
the district court's opinion.2 Therefore, one must return to the un-
derlying appeal6 3 in order to consider any relevant analysis in that
circuit.
At issue before the district court was the trustee's appeal from
the bankruptcy court's order granting summary judgment. 4 A
brief excerpt from the bankruptcy court's order granting summary
judgment65 provides sufficient factual exposition and insight into
the case to permit meaningful analysis. The bankruptcy court's or-
der provided, in relevant part:
preference period when the beneficiary of the transfers is an, insider creditor or an




59. Id at 1493. That requirement is found in 11 USC § 547(b)(5) and dictates that the
transfer must enable the creditor to receive more than it would have in a Chapter 7
liquidation.
60. Ray, 899 F2d at 1493.
61. Id.
62. See notes 4 and 50.
63. Lowrey v first National Bank of Bethany (In re Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc.), 97
Bankr 77 (W D Okla 1988).
64. In re Robinson, 97 Bankr at 97.




The Trustee, under these circumstances, cannot utilize 11 U.S.C. Section
550(a) to recover payments received by defendants who hold guarantees of
J.D. Hodges, an insider of debtor, outside of the 90 day period and within
one year of the filing of bankruptcy. Furtheremore, the [Bankruptcy] Court
finds that a reading of 11 U.S.C. Section 550(a) does not indicate that Con-
gress explicitly intended to circumvent 11 U.S.C. Section 547 by permitting
recovery for transfers outside of the 90 day period and within one year from
non-insider creditors. Based upon the ambiguities in 11 U.S.C. Section 550,
the [Bankruptcy] Court must consider the equities involved. A review of the
equitable considerations and long settled credit practices involving guaran-
tees, mitigates against permitting recovery from the non-insider creditors.6
In reversing the bankruptcy court's order, the district court
noted the differing schools of thought,67 acknowledging that the
majority of lower courts considering the issue have employed ei-
ther the "two-transfer" theory, or the "equitable power" of the
bankruptcy court, to deny recovery by the trustee. 8 The district
court then fully explored the majority approaches and the minority
approach of strict statutory construction, ultimately siding with
the latter. 9
Thus, of the two circuits which have now decided the same issue
presented to the Seventh Circuit in Deprizio, both have decided
the issue based entirely on a literal reading of the statutory lan-
guage. Additionally, all three circuit courts having decided the is-
sue to this date have soundly rejected what had heretofore been
the two majority approaches.
IV. THE IMMUTABLE LOGIC OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION
There is a certain irresistable logic to the circuits' strict con-
struction approach. By its plain language, the statute indicates
which transfers are to be treated as preferential °.7  Further, the
statute indicates the options for recovery which are available to the
trustee, should the transfers be deemed preferential.71 Why then,
when faced with such unambiguous statutory language, should the
courts feel constrained to engage in "equities analysis" or adopt
66. In re Robinson, 97 Bankr at 78-9.
67. Id at 79-81.
68. The court stated in this regard:
The majority view among lower courts who have decided the issue is supported by
either the 'two-transfer' theory . . . or by relying on the equitable powers of the
bankruptcy court under 11 U.S.C. Section 105 to prevent injustice, or both.
In re Robinson, 97 Bankr at 81 (footnote omitted).
69. Id at 82-83.
70. 11 USC § 547(b).
71. 11 USC § 550.
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fictional transfers in order to avoid the result which the statute
clearly dictates?
The courts and the commentators are in agreement that there is
no helpful legislative history to guide or temper the reading of the
statute in any manner.72 Some advocates, however, have argued
that this lack of legislative history indicates that Congress meant
to "preserve the practice, under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, of
recovering payments only from those to whom the transfer repre-
sented a preference . . . on the theory that if Congress made a
change as momentous as this, surely someone would have said
so." 73 This argument, however, ignores the fact that someone did
say so: Congress did, when the lengthy process of re-writing the
bankruptcy laws resulted in the enactment of a Code which con-
tained sections 547 and 550 in their present form."4 After a lengthy
and scholarly analysis of the above argument, the Seventh Circuit
summarily put the argument to rest with the following, well-con-
sidered, epitath: "[s]ilence in the legislative history therefore does
not require or authorize a court to depart from the text and struc-
ture of the Code.
7 5
72. See for example, Levit v Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp. (In re V.N. Deprizio Con-
struction Co.) 874 F2d 1186, 1196 (7th Cir 1989).
73. Id (citations omitted).
74. When this "lack of legislative history argument" was raised before the Seventh
Circuit, the court responded as follows:
Yet 'it is not the law that a statute can have no effects which are not explicitly men-
tioned in its legislative history' . . . When Congress makes wholesale changes in the
text and structure of the law, it is fatuous to pretend that a silent legislative history
means that existing practices should continue unchanged. The 1978 Code separates
the identification of avoidable transfers (§547) from the identification of those who
must pay (§550), a structural change with no antecedents in the 1898 Act. It also
creates for the first time the principle that transfers may be recoverable from either
transferee or beneficiary - something introduced to § 550(a)(1) in the Conference
Committee, too late for comment in the usual committee reports. Changes of this
character show that the pre-1978 practice is not a useful guide to interpreting the
relation between §§ 547 and 550.
Deprizio, 874 F2d at 1196-97 (footnotes and citations omitted).
75. Id at 1197 (citations omitted). This comment does not entirely ignore the thought-
provoking question of "how we read the Bankruptcy Code." See for example, Mark D.
Yochum, How We Read the Bankruptcy Code, 23 Juris 4 (Summer 1990) (citing Midlantic
National Bank v New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 474 US 494 (1986),
Kelly v Robinson, 479 US 36 (1986), and In re Ron Pair, 109 US 1026 (1989)). This line of
cases, however, seem only to confuse the issue. The Midlantic decision seems to indicate
that specific congressional intent is required in addition to specific code language, in order
to alter the law in a specific instance. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, suggested the
above conclusion in the following passage:
The normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to
change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific.
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Numerous other commentators have argued against a strict ap-
plication of the actual statutory provisions, arguing that to apply
the statute as written would work great inequities and permit nu-
merous unintended evils.76 It may well be true that certain results
under the preference sections of the Code were not literally in-
tended by the drafters. Still, does this justify ignoring the literal
language in pursuance of the desired result in each instance? To
permit the courts to decide the desired result on a case-by-case
basis and then to interpret the statute accordingly would be to
throw out the baby with the bath water. There already exists a
clear, concise statute which indicates what is to be done, given the
existence of certain factors. If the results that are reached by a
literal application of that statute are not desireable, then perhaps
additional legislation is required. But the legislation which is indi-
cated in such an instance is congressional, not judicial. Besides, as
the Seventh Circuit has indicated, the vast majority of commercial
payments will still be insulated under the defenses contained in
Section 547(c).11
Midlantic, 474 US at 501.
The decision in Kelly v Robinson, seems to be in agreement with the method of statutory
construction espoused in Midlantic. At the other end of the spectrum, however, is In re Ron
Pair, in which the majority permitted traditional bankruptcy doctrine to be altered signifi-
cantly by simple resort to a plain reading of the Code.
Thus, the author concludes that the cases cited do not provide consistent input on the
question of "How we read the Bankruptcy Code."
76. See for example, Katzen, Deprizio (cited in note 3): 4 Collier, § 550.02 at 550-57
(cited in note 3).
77. As the court indicated, "[flt is enough to observe the § 547(b)(5) and (c) ...ex-
clude from recovery the bulk of ordinary commercial payments. Deprizio, 874 F2d at 1196-
97. 11 USC section 547(c) provides in full:
The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(1) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose benefit such
transfer was made to be a contemporaenous exchange for new value
given to the debtor; and
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange;
(2) to the extend that such transfer was-
(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course
of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the
debtor and the transferee; and
(C) made according to ordinary business terms;
(3) that creates a security interest in property acquired by the debtor-
(A) to the extend such security interest secures new value [in the nature
of a purchase-money security interest] ...
(4) to or for the benefit of a creditor, to the extent that, after such transfer,
such creditor gave new value to or for the benefit of the debtor-
(A) not secured by an otherwise unavoidable security interest; and
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While it may initially appear that the literal application of the
preference sections may be inequitable in certain situations, most
notably the Deprizio-type situation, the persuasive logic behind
applying a statute as written far outweighs any perceived inequi-
ties. Adherence to a strict and predictable course of treatment in a
given situation is virtually as important in statutory construction
as is reading the words of the statute for what they say; not what
one wants them to say. In fact, the argument could be made that
only when the "rules" keep changing is the application of this por-
tion of the Bankruptcy Code, as written, somehow inequitable.
Once again, the Seventh Circuit's eloquent analysis of the problem
bears repeating:
Rules of law affecting parties to voluntary arrangements do not operate 'in-
equitably' in the business world - at least not once the rule is understood.
Prices adjust. If the extended preference period facilitates the operation of
bankruptcy as a collective debt-adjustment process, then credit will become
available on slightly better terms. If a longer period has the opposite effect,
creditors will charge slightly higher rates of interest and monitor debtors
more closely. In either case creditors will receive the competitive rate of
return in financial markets - the same risk-adjusted rate they would have
received with a 90-day preference-recovery period. A rule may injure debt-
ors and creditors by foreclosing efficient business arrangements and increas-
ing the rate of interest low-risk borrowers must pay, but inefficiency is not
inequity."8
In the Deprizio-type situation itself, aren't there really options
other than engaging in fiction-writing or "equity" analysis? For ex-
ample, when the trustee files suit against the outside creditor (the
lender), seeking to recover the payments made which were in re-
duction of the contingent liability of the insider creditor (the guar-
antor), why not simply allow the outside creditor to join the guar-
antor in the recovery action. In such a scenario, all of the parties to
the arrangement are before the court at one time. The court can
(B) on account of which new value the debtor did not make an otherwise
unavoidable transfer to or for the benefit of such creditor;
(5) that creates a perfected security interest in inventory or a receivable or the
proceeds of either, except to the extent that the aggregate of all such transfers
to the transferee caused a reduction . . . to the prejudice of other creditors
holding unsecured claims, of any amount by which the debt secured by such
security interest exceeded the value of all security interests for such debt on
[one of three defined dates] . .
(6) that is the fixing of a statutory lien that is not avoidable under section 545
of this title; or
(7) [aggregate transfers of less than $600 for an individual debtor].
78. Deprizio, 874 F2d at 1198 (citations omitted).
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then act in a fashion which is both consistent with the statute and
which prevents duplicative and circuitous litigation.
Some will undoubtedly argue that the guarantor is likely insol-
vent as well. This argument would seem to ignore both the purpose
of requiring an insider guarantor, and the dilligence required of a
lender who accepts such a guarantee. There are, arguably, but two
purposes to be served by an insider guarantee, one of which is le-
gitimate and the other, judicially and statutorily abhorred. The le-
gitimate purpose of such a guarantee is that in the event of default
on the part of the principal obligor, the guarantor will "stand" for
the debt and be obligated as well as able to make payment. To
achieve both obligation and ability requires lender dilligence. The
other, or illegitimate purpose, arises when the lender accepts the
guarantee of an insider whom the lender knows cannot possibly
satisfy the obligation if called Upon to do so. In such a circum-
stance, the only ascertainable purpose for the guarantee is to as-
sure that the guaranteed obligation will be satisfied or, reduced
first, in the event of financial difficulty on the part of the principal
obligor (of which the guarantor is an insider), in the preference
over the other creditors. Such is the action which sections 547 and
550 were designed to prevent.
In addition, there exist preventive measures which lenders can
adopt in order to prevent the harm of which all seem concerned.
The first such remedy is really more common sense than advice,
but it bears consideration. Hereinafter, lenders must carefully re-
view the necessity of demanding a guarantee from an insider, given
the holding of Deprizio. If some other form of security will achieve
the same result, absent the trustee's recovery, then a lender should
strongly consider opting for the alternative security. Along the
same lines, lenders should consider collateralizing their interest
with goods or equipment of the debtor corporation and/or requir-
ing a purchase money security interest in the goods or equipment,
as the circumstances dictate.
While the current state of the law on avoidable preferences of-
fers lenders more grief than guidance, all is not lost to the lender
who is willing to consider alternative security measures. In so do-
ing, cautious and sophisticated lenders can probably avoid the
Deprizio trap.
Timothy S. Johnson
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